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Abstract
In simple perceptual decisions the brain has to identify a stimulus based on noisy
sensory samples from the stimulus. Basic statistical considerations state that the
reliability of the stimulus information, i.e., the amount of noise in the samples,
should be taken into account when the decision is made. However, for perceptual
decision making experiments it has been questioned whether the brain indeed uses
the reliability for making decisions when confronted with unpredictable changes
in stimulus reliability. We here show that even the basic drift diffusion model,
which has frequently been used to explain experimental findings in perceptual
decision making, implicitly relies on estimates of stimulus reliability. We then
show that only those variants of the drift diffusion model which allow stimulus-
specific reliabilities are consistent with neurophysiological findings. Our analysis
suggests that the brain estimates the reliability of the stimulus on a short time scale
of at most a few hundred milliseconds.
1 Introduction
In perceptual decision making participants have to identify a noisy stimulus. In typical experiments,
only two possibilities are considered [1]. The amount of noise on the stimulus is usually varied to
manipulate task difficulty. With higher noise, participants’ decisions are slower and less accurate.
Early psychology research established that biased random walk models explain the response distri-
butions (choice and reaction time) of perceptual decision making experiments [2]. These models
describe decision making as an accumulation of noisy evidence until a bound is reached and cor-
respond, in discrete time, to sequential analysis [3] as developed in statistics [4]. More recently,
electrophysiological experiments provided additional support for such bounded accumulation mod-
els, see [1] for a review.
There appears to be a general consensus that the brain implements the mechanisms required for
bounded accumulation, although different models were proposed for how exactly this accumulation
is employed by the brain [5, 6, 1, 7, 8]. An important assumption of all these models is that the
brain provides the input to the accumulation, the so-called evidence, but the most established models
actually do not define how this evidence is computed by the brain [3, 5, 9, 1]. In this contribution, we
will show that addressing this question offers a new perspective on how exactly perceptual decision
making may be performed by the brain.
Probabilistic models provide a precise definition of evidence: Evidence is the likelihood of a de-
cision alternative under a noisy measurement where the likelihood is defined through a generative
model of the measurements under the hypothesis that the considered decision alternative is true. In
particular, this generative model implements assumptions about the expected distribution of mea-
surements. Therefore, the likelihood of a measurement is large when measurements are assumed,
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by the decision maker, to be reliable and small otherwise. For modelling perceptual decision making
experiments, the evidence input, which is assumed to be pre-computed by the brain, should simi-
larly depend on the reliability of measurements as estimated by the brain. However, this has been
disputed before, e.g. [10]. The argument is that typical experimental setups make the reliability of
each trial unpredictable for the participant. Therefore, it was argued, the brain can have no correct
estimate of the reliability. This issue has been addressed in a neurally inspired, probabilistic model
based on probabilistic population codes (PPCs) [7]. The authors have shown that PPCs can imple-
ment perceptual decision making without having to explicitly represent reliability in the decision
process. This remarkable result has been obtained by making the comprehensible assumption that
reliability has a multiplicative effect on the tuning curves of the neurons in the PPCs. Reliability,
therefore, was implicitly represented in the tuning curves of model neurons which leaves the open
question why tuning curves exhibit a multiplicative effect of reliability.
In this paper we will consider this question from a more conceptual perspective under the interpre-
tation that the multiplicative effect on tuning curves results from adaptation of internal estimates
of measurement reliability in the brain. We show that even a simple, widely used bounded accu-
mulation model, the drift diffusion model, is based on some estimate of measurement reliability.
Using this result, we will analyse the results of a perceptual decision making experiment [11] and
will show that the recorded behaviour together with neurophysiological findings strongly favours
the hypothesis that the brain weights evidence using a current estimate of measurement reliability,
even when reliability changes unpredictably across trials.
This paper is organised as follows: We first introduce the notions of measurement, evidence and
likelihood in the context of the experimentally well-established random dot motion (RDM) stimulus.
We define these quantities formally by resorting to a simple probabilistic model which has been
shown to be equivalent to the drift diffusion model [12, 13]. This, in turn, allows us to formulate
three competing variants of the drift diffusion model that either do not use trial-dependent reliability
(variant CONST), or do use trial-dependent reliability of measurements during decision making
(variants DDM and DEPC, see below for definitions). Finally, using data of [11], we show that
only variants DDM and DEPC, which use trial-dependent reliability, are consistent with previous
findings about perceptual decision making in the brain.
2 Measurement, evidence and likelihood in the random dot motion stimulus
The widely used random dot motion (RDM) stimulus consists of a set of randomly located dots
shown within an invisible circle on a screen [14]. From one video frame to the next some of the
dots move into one direction which is fixed within a trial of an experiment, i.e., a subset of the dots
moves coherently in one direction. All other dots are randomly replaced within the circle. Although
there are many variants of how exactly to present the dots [15], the main idea is that the coherently
moving dots indicate a motion direction which participants have to decide upon. By varying the
proportion of dots which move coherently, also called the ’coherence’ of the stimulus, the difficulty
of the task can be varied effectively.
We will now consider what kind of evidence the brain can in principle extract from the RDM stim-
ulus in a short time window, for example, from one video frame to the next, within a trial. For
simplicity we call this time window ’time point’ from here on, the idea being that evidence is ac-
cumulated over different time points, as postulated by bounded accumulation models in perceptual
decision making [3, 1].
At a single time point, the brain can measure motion directions from the dots in the RDM display. By
construction, a proportion of measurable motion directions will be into one specific direction, but,
through the random relocation of other dots, the RDM display will also contain motion in random
directions. Therefore, the brain observes a distribution of motion directions at each time point. This
distribution can be considered a ’measurement’ of the RDM stimulus made by the brain. Due to the
randomness of each time frame, this distribution varies across time points and the variation in the
distribution reduces for increasing coherences. We have illustrated this using rose histograms in Fig.
1 for three different coherence levels.
To compute the evidence for the decision whether the RDM stimulus contains predominantly motion
to one of the two considered directions, e.g., left and right, the brain must check how strongly these
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Figure 1: Illustration of possible motion direction distributions that the brain can measure from
an RDM stimulus. Rows are different time points, columns are different coherences. The true,
underlying motion direction was ’left’, i.e., 180◦. For low coherence (e.g., 3.2%) the measured
distribution is very variable across time points and may indicate the presence of many different
motion directions at any given time point. As coherence increases (from 9% to 25.6%), the true,
underlying motion direction will increasingly dominate measured motion directions simultaneously
leading to decreased variation of the measured distribution across time points.
directions are represented in the measured distribution, e.g., by estimating the proportion of motion
towards left and right. We call these proportions evidence for left, eleft, and evidence for right,
eright. As the measured distribution over motion directions may vary strongly across time points, the
computed evidences for each single time point may be unreliable. Probabilistic approaches weight
evidence by its reliability such that unreliable evidence is not over-interpreted. The question is: Does
the brain perform this reliability-based computation as well? More formally, for a given coherence,
c, does the brain weight evidence by an estimate of reliability that depends on c: l = e · r(c)1 and
which we call ’likelihood’, or does it ignore changing reliabilities and use a weighting unrelated to
coherence: e′ = e · r¯?
3 Bounded accumulation models
Bounded accumulation models postulate that decisions are made based on a decision variable. In
particular, this decision variable is driven towards the correct alternative and is perturbed by noise.
A decision is made, when the decision variable reaches a specific value. In the drift diffusion model,
these three components are represented by drift, diffusion and bound [3]. We will now relate the
typical drift diffusion formalism to our notions of measurement, evidence and likelihood by linking
the drift diffusion model to probabilistic formulations.
In the drift diffusion model, the decision variable evolves according to a simple Wiener process with
drift. In discrete time the change in the decision variable y can be written as
δy = yt − yt−δt = vδt+
√
δtst (1)
where v is the drift, t ∼ N(0, 1) is Gaussian noise and s controls the amount of diffusion. This
equation bears an interesting link to how the brain may compute the evidence. For example, it has
been stated in the context of an experiment with RDM stimuli with two decision alternatives that
the change in y, often called ’momentary evidence’, ”is thought to be a difference in firing rates of
direction selective neurons with opposite direction preferences.” [11, Supp. Fig. 6] Formally:
δy = ρleft,t − ρright,t (2)
1For convenience, we use imprecise denominations here. As will become clear below, l is in our case a
Gaussian log-likelihood, hence, the linear weighting of evidence by reliability.
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where ρleft,t is the firing rate of the population selective to motion towards left at time point t.
Because the firing rates ρ depend on the considered decision alternative, they represent a form of
evidence extracted from the stimulus measurement instead of the stimulus measurement itself (see
our definitions in the previous section). It is unclear, however, whether the firing rates ρ just represent
the evidence (ρ = e′) or whether they represent the likelihood, ρ = l, i.e., the evidence weighted by
coherence-dependent reliability.
To clarify the relation between firing rates ρ, evidence e and likelihood l we consider probabilistic
models of perceptual decision making. Several variants have been suggested and related to other
forms of decision making [6, 16, 9, 7, 12, 17, 18]. For its simplicity, which is sufficient for our
argument, we here consider the model presented in [13] for which a direct transformation from
probabilistic model to the drift diffusion model has already been shown. This model defines two
Gaussian generative models of measurements which are derived from the stimulus:
p(xt|left) = N(−1, δtσˆ2) p(xt|right) = N(1, δtσˆ2) (3)
where σˆ represents the variability of measurements expected by the brain. Similarly, it is assumed
that the measurements xt are sampled from a Gaussian with variance σ2 which captures variance
both from the stimulus and due to other noise sources in the brain:
xt ∼ N(±1, δtσ2). (4)
Evidence for a decision is computed in this model by calculating the likelihood of a measurement
xt under the hypothesised generative models. To be precise we consider the log-likelihood which is
l = − log(
√
2piδtσˆ)− 1
2
(xt ± 1)2
δtσˆ2
. (5)
There are three important points: 1) The first term on the right hand side means that l increases
independently of the stimulus xt for decreasing σˆ. This contribution cancels when the difference
between the likelihoods for left and right is computed. 2) The likelihood is large for a measurement
xt, when xt is close to the values hypothesised for the decision alternatives, i.e., −1 and 1. 3) The
contribution of the stimulus is weighted by the assumed reliability r = σˆ−2.
This model of the RDM stimulus is simple but captures the most important properties of the stim-
ulus. In particular, a high coherence RDM stimulus has a large proportion of motion in the correct
direction with very low variability of measurements whereas a low coherence RDM stimulus tends
to have lower proportions of motion in the correct direction, with high variability (cf. Fig. 1). The
Gaussian model captures these properties by adjusting the noise variance such that a high coherence
corresponds to low noise and low coherence to high noise: Under high noise the values xt will vary
strongly and tend to be rather distant from−1 and 1, whereas for low noise the values xt will be close
to −1 or 1 with low variability. Hence, as expected, the model produces large evidences/likelihoods
for low noise and small evidences/likelihoods for high noise.
This intuitive relation between stimulus and probabilistic model is the basis for us to proceed to
show that the reliability of the stimulus r, connected to the coherence level c, appears at a prominent
position in the drift diffusion model. Crucially, the drift diffusion model can be derived as the sum
of log-likelihood ratios across time [3, 9, 12, 13]. In particular, a discrete time drift diffusion process
can be derived by subtracting the likelihoods of Eq. (5):
δy = lright − lleft = (xt + 1)
2 − (xt − 1)2
2δtσˆ2
=
2rxt
δt
. (6)
Consequently, the change in y is Gaussian: δy ∼ N(2r/δt, 4r2σ2/δt). This replicates the model
described in [11, Supp. Fig. 6] where the parameterisation of the model, however, more di-
rectly followed that of the Gaussian distribution and did not explicitly take time into account:
δy ∼ N(Kc, S2), where K and S are free parameters and c is coherence of the RDM stimulus.
By analogy to the probabilistic model, we, therefore, see that the model in [11] implicitly assumes
that reliability r depends on coherence c.
More generally, the parameters of the drift diffusion model of Eq. (1) and that of the probabilistic
model can be expressed as functions of each other [13]:
v = ± 2
δt2σˆ2
= ±r 2
δt2
(7)
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s =
2σ
δtσˆ2
= r
2σ
δt
. (8)
These equations state that both drift v and diffusion s depend on the assumed reliability r of the
measurements x. Does the brain use and necessarily compute this reliability which depends on
coherence? In the following section we answer this question by comparing how well three variants
of the drift diffusion model, that implement different assumptions about r, conform to experimental
findings.
4 Use of reliability in perceptual decision making: experimental evidence
We first show that different assumptions about the reliability r translate to variants of the drift dif-
fusion model. We then fit all variants to behavioural data (performances and mean reaction times)
of an experiment for which neurophysiological data has also been reported [11] and demonstrate
that only those variants which allow reliability to depend on coherence level lead to accumulation
mechanisms which are consistent with the neurophysiological findings.
4.1 Drift diffusion model variants
For the drift diffusion model of Eq. (1) the accuracy A and mean decision time T predicted by the
model can be determined analytically [9]:
A = 1− 1
1 + exp( 2vbs2 )
(9)
T =
b
v
tanh
(
vb
s2
)
(10)
where b is the bound. These equations highlight an important caveat of the drift diffusion model:
Only two of the three parameters can be determined uniquely from behavioural data. For fitting
the model one of the parameters needs to be fixed. In most cases, the diffusion s is set to c = 0.1
arbitrarily [9], or is fit with a constant value across stimulus strengths [11]. We call this standard
variant of the drift diffusion model the DDM.
If s is constant across stimulus strengths, the other two parameters of the model must explain dif-
ferences in behaviour, between stimulus strengths, by taking on values that depend on stimulus
strength. Indeed, it has been found that primarily drift v explains such differences, see also be-
low. Eq. (7) states that drift depends on estimated reliability r. So, if drift varies across stimulus
strengths, this strongly suggests that r must vary across stimulus strengths, i.e., that r must depend
on coherence: r(c). However, the drift diffusion formalism allows for two other obvious variants
of parameterisation. One in which the bound b is constant across stimulus strengths, b = b¯, and,
conversely, one in which drift v is constant across stimulus strengths, v = v¯ ∝ r¯ (Eq. 7). We call
these variants DEPC and CONST, respectively, for their property to weight evidence by reliability
that either depends on coherence, r(c), or not, r¯.
4.2 Experimental data
In the following we will analyse the data presented in [11]. This data set has two major advantages
for our purposes: 1) Reported accuracies and mean reaction times (Fig. 1d,f) are averages based on
15,937 trials in total. Therefore, noise in this data set is minimal (cf. small error bars in Fig. 1d,f)
such that any potential effects of overfitting on found parameter values will be small, especially in
relation to the effect induced by different stimulus strengths. 2) The behavioural data is accompanied
by recordings of neurons which have been implicated in the decision making process. We can,
therefore, compare the accumulation mechanisms resulting from the fit to behaviour with the actual
neurophysiological recordings. Furthermore, the structure of the experiments was such that the
stimulus in subsequent trials had random strength, i.e., the brain could not have estimated stimulus
strength of a trial before the trial started.
In the experiment of [11], that we consider here, two monkeys performed a two-alternative forced
choice task based on the RDM stimulus. Data for eight different coherences were reported. To avoid
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ceiling effects, which prevent the unique identification of parameter values in the drift diffusion
model, we exclude those coherences which lead to an accuracy of 0.5 (random choices) or to an
accuracy of 1 (perfect choices). The behavioural data of the remaining six coherence levels are
presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Behavioural data of [11] used in our analysis. RT = reaction time.
coherence (%): 3.2 6.4 9 12 25.6
accuracy (fraction): 0.63 0.76 0.79 0.89 0.99
mean RT (ms): 613 590 580 535 440
The analysis of [11] revealed a nondecision time, i.e., a component of the reaction time that is
unrelated to the decision process (cf. [3]) of ca. 200ms. Using this estimate, we determined the
mean decision time T by subtracting 200ms from the mean reaction times shown in Table 1.
The main findings for the neural recordings, which replicated previous findings [19, 1], were that i)
firing rates at the end of decisions were similar and, particularly, showed no significant relation to
coherence [11, Fig. 5] whereas ii) the buildup rate of neural firing within a trial had an approximately
linear relation to coherence [11, Fig. 4].
4.3 Fits of drift diffusion model variants to behaviour
We can easily fit the model variants (DDM, DEPC and CONST) to accuracy A and mean decision
time T using Eqs. (9) and (10). In accordance with previous approaches we selected values for the
respective redundant parameters. Since the redundant parameter value, or its inverse, simply scales
the fitted parameter values (cf. Eqs. 9 and 10), the exact value is irrelevant and we fix, in each model
variant, the redundant parameter to 1.
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Figure 2: Fitting results: values of the free parameters, that replicate the accuracy and mean RT
recorded in the experiment (Table 1), in relation to coherence. The remaining, non-free parameter
was fixed to 1 for each variant. Left: the DDM variant with free parameters drift v (green) and
bound b (purple). Middle: the DEPC variant with free parameters v and diffusion s (orange). Right:
the CONST variant with free parameters s and b.
Fig. 2 shows the inferred parameter values. In congruence with previous findings, the DDM variant
explained variation in behaviour due to an increasing coherence mostly with an increasing drift v
(green in Fig. 2). Specifically, drift and coherence appear to have a straightforward, linear relation.
The same finding holds for the DEPC variant. In contrast to the DDM variant, however, which also
exhibited a slight increase in the bound b (purple in Fig. 2) with increasing coherence, the DEPC
variant explained the corresponding differences in behaviour by decreasing diffusion s (orange in
Fig. 2). As the drift v was fixed in CONST, this variant explained coherence-dependent behaviour
with large and almost identical changes in both diffusion s and bound b such that large parameter
values occurred for small coherences and the relation between parameters and coherence appeared
to be quadratic.
We further investigated the properties of the model variants with the fitted parameter values. The top
row of Fig. 3 shows example drift diffusion trajectories (y in Eq. (1)) simulated at a resolution of
1ms for two coherences. Following [11], we interpret y as the decision variables represented by the
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Figure 3: Drift-diffusion properties of fitted model variants. Top row: 15 example trajectories of y
for different model variants with fitted parameters for 6.4% (blue) and 25.6% (yellow) coherence.
Trajectories end when they reach the bound for the first time which corresponds to the decision
time in that simulated trial. Notice that the same random samples of  were used across variants
and coherences. Bottom row: Trajectories of y averaged over trials in which the first alternative (top
bound) was chosen for the three model variants. Format of the plots follows that of [8, Supp. Fig. 4]:
Left panels show the buildup of y from the start of decision making for the 5 different coherences.
Right panels show the averaged drift diffusion trajectories when aligned to the time that a decision
was made.
firing rates of neurons in monkey area LIP. These plots exemplify that the DDM and DEPC variants
lead to qualitatively very similar predictions of neural responses whereas the trajectories produced
by the CONST variant stand out, because the neural responses to large coherences are predicted to
be smaller than those to small coherences.
We have summarised predicted neural responses to all coherences in the bottom row of Fig. 3 where
we show averages of y across 5000 trials either aligned to the start of decision making (left pan-
els) or aligned to the decision time (right panels). These plots illustrate that the DDM and DEPC
variants replicate the main neurophysiological findings of [11]: Neural responses at the end of the
decision were similar and independent of coherence. For the DEPC variant this was built into the
model, because the bound was fixed. For the DDM variant the bound shows a small dependence
on coherence, but the neural responses aligned to decision time were still very similar across coher-
ences. The DDM and DEPC variants, further, replicate the finding that the buildup of neural firing
depends approximately linear on coherence (normalised mean square error of a corresponding linear
model was 0.04 and 0.03, respectively). In contrast, the CONST variant exhibited an inverse rela-
tion between coherence and buildup of predicted neural response, i.e., buildup was larger for small
coherences. Furthermore, neural responses at decision time strongly depended on coherence. There-
fore, the CONST variant, as the only variant which does not use coherence-dependent reliability, is
also the only variant which is clearly inconsistent with the neurophysiological findings.
5 Discussion
We have investigated whether the brain uses online estimates of stimulus reliability when making
simple perceptual decisions. From a probabilistic perspective fundamental considerations suggest
that using accurate estimates of stimulus reliability lead to better decisions, but in the field of percep-
tual decision making it has been questioned that the brain estimates stimulus reliability on the very
short time scale of a few hundred milliseconds. By using a probabilistic formulation of the most
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widely accepted model we were able to show that only those variants of the model which assume
online reliability estimation are consistent with reported experimental findings.
Our argument is based on a strict distinction between measurements, evidence and likelihood which
may be briefly summarised as follows: Measurements are raw stimulus features that do not relate to
the decision, evidence is a transformation of measurements into a decision relevant space reflecting
the decision alternatives and likelihood is evidence scaled by a current estimate of measurement
reliabilities. It is easy to overlook this distinction at the level of bounded accumulation models,
such as the drift diffusion model, because these models assume a pre-computed form of evidence as
input. However, this evidence has to be computed by the brain, as we have demonstrated based on
the example of the RDM stimulus and using behavioural data.
We chose one particular, simple probabilistic model, because this model has a direct equivalence
with the drift diffusion model which was used to explain the data of [11] before. Other models may
have not allowed conclusions about reliability estimates in the brain. In particular, [13] introduced
an alternative model that also leads to equivalence with the drift diffusion model, but explains dif-
ferences in behaviour by different mean measurements and their representations in the generative
model. Instead of varying reliability across coherences, this model would vary the difference of
means in the second summand of Eq. (5) directly without leading to any difference on the drift
diffusion trajectories represented by y of Eq. (1) when compared to those of the probabilistic model
chosen here. The interpretation of the alternative model of [13], however, is far removed from basic
assumptions about the RDM stimulus: Whereas the alternative model assumes that the reliability of
the stimulus is fixed across coherences, the noise in the RDM stimulus clearly depends on coherence.
We, therefore, discarded the alternative model here.
As a slight caveat, the neurophysiological findings, on which we based our conclusion, could have
been the result of a search for neurons that exhibit the properties of the conventional drift diffusion
model (the DDM variant). We cannot exclude this possibility completely, but given the wide range
and persistence of consistent evidence for the standard bounded accumulation theory of decision
making [1, 20] we find it rather unlikely that the results in [19] and [11] were purely found by
chance. Even if our conclusion about the rapid estimation of reliability by the brain does not en-
dure, our formal contribution holds: We clarified that the drift diffusion model in its most common
variant (DDM) is consistent with, and even implicitly relies on, coherence-dependent estimates of
measurement reliability.
In the experiment of [11] coherences of the RDM stimulus were chosen randomly for each trial.
Consequently, participants could not predict the reliability of the RDM stimulus for the upcoming
trial, i.e., the participants’ brains could not have had a good estimate of stimulus reliability at the
start of a trial. Yet, our analysis strongly suggests that coherence-dependent reliabilities were used
during decision making. The brain, therefore, must had adapted reliability within trials even on the
short timescale of a few hundred milliseconds. On the level of analysis dictated by the drift diffusion
model we cannot observe this adaptation. It only manifests itself as a change in mean drift that is
assumed to be constant within a trial. First models of simultaneous decision making and reliability
estimation have been suggested [21], but clearly more work in this direction is needed to elucidate
the underlying mechanism used by the brain.
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